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THE SECRET OF VENETIAN SUCCESS: 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 






The commercial success of Venice hinged on her merchants’ ability to do 
business with borrowed money. However, to raise other people’s capital, merchants 
needed to commit not to embezzle the capital received. Despite this commitment 
problem, the evidence indicates an active financial market through which the Venetians, 
by and large, mobilized their savings to investments. What were the institutional 
foundations of this market? This paper claims that neither reputation-based institutions 
that did not rely on the state nor a coercive legal system provided such foundations. 
Instead, the state generated the rents and information required to induce merchants to 
refrain from acting opportunistically. 
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   1
Long-distance trade contributed much to the great European expansion of the late 
Middle Ages from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries.
1 The Italian city-states were the 
nerve centers of this process and, among them, Venice excelled in economic growth, political 
stability, and social development.
2 The commercial rise of Venice depended to a large 
measure on the extent to which financial markets enabled Venetian citizens to convert their 
savings into risky investments in overseas trade.
3 However, the operation of financial markets 
required that merchants were able to commit ex-ante not to embezzle ex-post part or all of the 
investors’ capital. How was the commitment problem mitigated?  
Previous historical institutional analyses, most notably the work by Avner Greif, have 
found that various reputation mechanisms in the absence of the state or even despite the 
abuses of the state enabled trade relations to expand during the Commercial Revolution.
4 In 
contrast, this paper finds that the state played an active and salutary role in encouraging 
commerce and suggests that this distinctiveness might well be among the factors leading 
Venice to be the most economically successful and lasting among the maritime Italian city-
states. Yet, the Venetian state cannot be identified with the legal system, at least as 
traditionally described by economic historians and economists. For example, some scholars, 
such as Roberto S. Lopez and Raymond de Roover, have implicitly assumed that the legal 
system could enforce the execution of all contracts.
5 Others, such as Carlo M. Cipolla and 
Douglass C. North, have noted the limits on exchange imposed by the boundaries of the 
court’s jurisdictional power and information costs, but have failed to provide any detailed 
analysis of the institutions that motivated merchants to refrain from reneging and 
misrepresenting information in the absence of an effective legal system.
6 
This paper, in contrast, argues that the Venetian state supported a reputation 
mechanism through which the carrot of economic rents, on the one hand, and the stick of 
losing these rents and, possibly, legal suits, on the other hand, induced merchants to fulfill 
                                                      
1 Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution; Lopez, Commercial Revolution; and de Roover, “Organization.” 
2 Lane, Venice, and Norwich, History of Venice. 
3 Lane, Venice and History, pp. 56-57. 
4 Greif, “Reputation”, “Contract Enforceability”, “Cultural Beliefs”, “Political Foundations,” and Institutions. 
For other non-state reputation mechanisms, see also, Clay, “Trade;” Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 
“Coordination;” Hicks and Thompson, “New Theory;” Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, Priceless 
Markets; Moriguchi, “Implicit Contracts;” and Yang, “Transacting.” For other related works on development 
economics and public finance, see, among many, Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, “Thy Neighbors’s Keeper;” 
Besly, “Property Rights;” Besly , Coate, and Loury, “Economics;” and Fafchamp, Market Institutions. 
5 Lopez, Commercial Revolution, and de Roover, “Organization.” 
6 Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, p. 164 and North, Institutions, p. 57. Other works in the area of Law 
and Economics have stressed the fixed cost of lawsuits, the offender’s inability to repay in the absence of 
collateral, the long duration of judicial proceedings, and the potential subversion of justice (Posner, Economic 
Analysis; Shavell, “Model;” Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shelifer, “Courts,” and Bianco, Japelli and 
Pagano, “Courts and Banks;” and Glaeser and Shleifer, “Rise of the Regulatory State”).    2
their contractual obligations with other Venetians, thereby enabling them to exchange through 
financial markets. First, Venice exclusive trading rights and political barriers to entry created 
the economic rents required to motivate city-merchants not to embezzle the investors’ capital 
and flee to avoid sanctions. Second, tight administrative controls over trade provided the 
(verifiable) information required to evaluate merchants’ conduct and to punish cheaters. 
Third, the state used both its administrative power to exclude fraudulent merchants from 
enjoying present and future economic rents and its coercive power to confiscate their 
properties within Venice and her colonies. Finally, Venice limited government induced those 
running the state to provide impartial third-party enforcement to the Venetians and to not 
abuse their power.
7  
The fact that Venetian citizens benefited from economic rents is not new. For 
example, Frederic C. Lane has formerly pointed out that outstanding commercial privileges 
abroad, protective convoys, and staple rights made Venetian commerce more secure and 
profitable.
8 Yet, the interplay between the subsequent economic rents and the state’s ability to 
enforce contracts has passed unnoticed. Furthermore, the state did not only implement a 
commercially-oriented naval and diplomatic policy aimed at achieving economic rents but it 
also introduced political restrictions on entry when the commercial expansion that it fostered 
eventually pushed rents down. The Venetian state thus enabled the mobilization of the entire 
City’s resources to long-distance trade for over two centuries but excluded foreigners and 
after 1305 Venice general populace below the rank of citizen from Venetian privileged trade. 
Nonetheless, the Venetian state sustained broader financial relations than those prevailing in 
other contemporary cities where the government played only a minor role in enforcing 
contracts. 
Yet, an important question remains to be addressed. Was the state a self-enforcing 
institution? An analysis of the interaction among Venice economic institutions, social 
structure and political system suggests that the state actually motivated the Venetians to take 
the actions that, on the aggregate, perpetuated the state. The operation of the state as an 
impartial third-party enforcer enabled the Venetians to exchange through financial markets 
and hence ensured a wide distribution of trading profits. This motivated the Venetians to 
cooperate in rendering the polity of Venice supportive to trade and to resist anyone’s attempt 
                                                      
7 In this respect, this paper links to the political science literature on the governments’ commitment problem: any 
government strong enough to define and arbitrate property rights is also strong enough to abrogate them for its 
own benefit. Unless the government finds a way to tie its own hands, the population will not invest, thereby 
depriving the government from the tax revenues necessary to ensure its own survival. For some historical 
solutions to this problems, see Caballero, “Institutional Change;” Greif, “Political Foundations;” Greif, Milgrom 
and Weingast, “Coordination;” Haber, Razo and Maurer, Politics of Property Rights; North, Structure and 
Change; and North and Weingast, “Evolution of Institutions.” See also Olson, Power and Prosperity. 
8 Lane, Venice, pp. 32-43, 58-63 and 125.   3
to gain political control over the city and its economic resources, which in turn reduced the 
incentives to challenge the existing institutions. 
To conduct this work, I draw on the almost 1000 notary acts preserved in the State 
Archive of Venice and transcribed in full by Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca and Antonio 
Lombardo for the period 1021-1261.
9 To better interpret this fragmentary and notary-biased 
evidence, I compare it with secondary studies based on Genoese notary records of the twelfth 
century. These historical records enable me to, first, build up a context-specific game in 
which the state emerges as an institutional equilibrium and, second, evaluate various 
theoretical predictions generated by the game under the assumption that the state governed 
financial relations. Empirical confirmation of these predictions lends support to the hypothesis 
that the state functioned as an enforcement and information-transmission mechanism. This 
view is further corroborated by the weakness of alternative explanations: neither the fear of 
God, loyalty among the family, nor private-order institutions based on bilateral or multilateral 
reputation are theoretically consistent with the observed operation of anonymous markets 
among the Venetians and with the exclusion of non-Venetians.  
1.  Financial Markets 
The large extent to which financial markets operated among the Venetians from the 
eleventh to the thirteenth century has been celebrated by the eminent historian of Venice, 
Gino Luzzatto. According to him, “the situation and mentality of those crowded groups of 
financiers of maritime trade did not differ much from that of today's savers in a big city where 
wealth prevails in the form of personal estate. Soon after they observe a joint stock company 
to flourish, they hasten to buy the equities it issue although they are awarded of the complete 
lack of control over its management.”
10 The evidence indeed reveals that financiers of all 
means, social status and occupations invested a substantial part of their wealth in overseas 
trade. For example, at the time of his death in 1268 the ruler of Venice doge Raniero Zeno 
held over half of his fortune in 132 commenda contracts of various amounts.
11 From the 
testament of the prosperous although non-noble merchant Lazzaro Mercadante we know that 
in 1281 he also held most of his property invested in overseas trade.
12 Besides, the funding of 
long-distance trade in Venice was in no way confined to a professional merchant class, but it 
                                                      
9 Morozzo de la Rocca and Lombardo (henceforth MRL), Documenti and Nuovi Documenti. 
10 Luzzatto, Studi, p. 72. The Venetian commenda has been often assimilated to an equity contract. In other 
localities, however, the commenda worked both as a financial and as a labor contract. There is no controversy 
about the financial character of the sea loan, which has been identified with a bond or a debt contract. 
11 Luzzatto, Studi, pp. 81-87. 
12 Ibid. pp. 61-65.    4
was rather opened to orphans and widows, priest and nuns, craftsmen and other persons 
without business experience.
13 In sharp contrast, Genoese cartularies indicate that the 
Genoese invested a significant portion of their capital in non-trade related activities and that 
trade investments were concentrated on the hands of a few noble families.
14  
Financial relations in Venice were very flexible. Well-established merchants received 
funds from investors with considerable assets and political influence as well as from small 
investors. For example, Domenico Gradenigo, who had been born into a centuries’ old 
Venetian patrician family, raised funds for a voyage from Venice to Constantinople and back 
in 1223 simultaneously from Pietro Ziani, the ruler of Venice himself and probably the richest 
men in town, and from a widow of aristocratic origin.
15 Likewise, ambitious young merchants 
received funds both from rich investors with a high social and political standing and from 
ordinary members of society with some cash. During the late-twelfth century Pangrazio 
Stagnario, the son of a liberated Croat slave, raised funds from both Pietro Ziani and various 
other investors whose families are unknown.
16 That one of Pangrazio’s sons, Zaccaria 
Stagnario, handled much larger sums in commerce than did Domenico Gradenigo, owned 
significant estates, and held high public office testify to the fluidity of Venetian society.
17  
Usually a merchant received funds from several investors, while investing in other 
merchants’ ventures for the sake of diversification. In 1167 Romano Mairano outfitted two 
ships for a round trip from Constantinople to Alexandria. In addition to raising funds “to carry 
on the ship in which he was master” both internally through his own investments and 
externally through eight sea loans, he financed several of the merchants who voyaged on the 
second ship. The extent to which this practice was commonplace is reflected by the fact that 
half of Romano’s eight documented creditors were themselves merchants on this latter ship.
18 
Cautious investors did not only diversify by giving their money to several merchants going to 
the same destination, but also trading in different goods, centers and periods of time. For 
                                                      
13 The Author based on MRL, Documenti and Nuovi Documenti.  
14 Greif, Cultural Beliefs, pp. 928-29. In actual fact, the number of the Genoese active in trade increased 
dramatically by the end of the twelfth century. Yet, Venice stood out for channeling the capital of a wider range 
of people into overseas commerce. In 1305 political barriers to entry excluded the common people below the 
rank of citizen from Venetian financial markets but all citizens engaged in overseas trade with almost the same 
rights. 
15 MRL, Documenti, # 604-605. More generally, see Buenger, “Domenico Gradenigo.”  
16 MRL, Documenti, # 265, 301, 333, 357, and 415. 
17 Ibid. # 370, 444, 467, 487, 517, 526, and 566, and Ibid. Nuovi Documenti, # 75. See also Buenger, “Domenico 
Gradenigo.” From the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries Venetian society was characterized by a high but 
decreasing degree of upward mobility (Castagnetti, “Comune;” Gasparri, “Orseolo,” pp. 797 and Lane, Venice, 
pp. 89-91). However, the Closing of the Great Council in 1297 made political office a prerogative of the 
patriciate and regulations passed in 1305 excluded Venice populace from the rank of citizens admitted to 
overseas trade.  
18 Ibid., # 183, 187-190, 193-198, 201, 203.   5
example, in 1235 Gabriel Marignoni invested in two sea ventures, one to Fermo in the West 
Adriatic and the other to the Eastern Meditterranean, and in 1238 he once again financed 
another two merchants, one heading to Ancona in Italy and the other to Zara in Dalmatia.
19 
To spread the risks inherent in overseas trade, the Venetians, in addition to 
diversifying their portfolios to the extent possible, used sea loans and commenda contracts. 
The sea loan was a fixed payment loan with the particular feature that the investor took the 
risk of loss by shipwreck, piracy or confiscation by greedy rulers in foreign lands and was 
therefore allowed a higher rate of return. The commenda or collegantia, as the Venetians 
called it, was a partnership agreement through which an investor supplied funds on which he 
both accepted the risk of loss and received a return depending on the trade conducted by a 
merchant. The sea loan, which was the dominant contract in Venetian long-distance trade 
during the early and mid twelfth century, was progressively replaced by the commenda, 
which prevailed by the third decade of the thirteenth century.
20 
2.  The State as a Self-sustaining Institution for Contract Enforcement 
Venetian financial markets were instrumental to the City commercial success. 
However, mobilizing capital from savings into risky investments in overseas trade required 
that merchants were able to commit on their financial obligations. For example, a potential 
investor would not fund a sea venture without being assured that the merchant would not take 
his money and run.  Neither would he enter into a risky exchange unless he was convinced 
that the merchant would comply with the terms of the contract. In the absence of institutions 
enabling merchants to commit on their agreements, financial relations would have not 
transpired. Yet, the evidence indicates a very active financial market through which Venetians 
of all means, ranks, and professions invested sizeable sums into a partially diversified 
portfolio in long-distance trade. What were the institutional foundations of this market?  
2.1.  The Legal System, Incentives and Economic Rents 
Although long-lasting legal institutions― such as a codified system of law, permanent 
courts, and judicial enforcement based on confiscation of the offender’s property― emerged 
during this period of time, a medieval court could not use coercion over a merchant who 
emigrated. Tracking down a fleeing merchant at a time previous to the passport, the credit 
card, and the current communications and information technology was still more difficult than 
                                                      
19 See Ibid., # 694 and 701, and 709, 711 and 715.  
20 The Author based on MRL, Documenti and Nuovi Documenti.   6
locating today a fraudulent CEO who secretly moves to a fancy villa in the middle of 
nowhere. Even if a merchant could be located, a Venetian court had no jurisdiction over a 
rival state’s newly naturalized citizen.
21 In later centuries the frightful Council of Ten was 
renowned for hiring assassins to hunt down traitors to the Republic throughout Europe, but 
late-medieval Venetians could not count on these coercive means to enforce their financial 
agreements. 
Incentives for merchants to resist the temptation of fleeing with the investor’s capital 
were thus necessary to enable them to commit on their financial obligations. The theory of 
repeated games tells us that a merchant can be induced to voluntarily refrain from embezzling 
the investor’s capital and never return to Venice by creating a gap between the merchant’s 
expected lifetime utility of keeping his city affiliation and his best alternative elsewhere. The 
evidence indicates that the Venetian state created such gap by generating exclusive economic 
rents and distributing them among all Venetian merchants fairly. 
The economic rents derived mainly from Venice staple rights, the organization and 
protection of state’s convoys, and commercial privileges abroad. First, staple rights favored 
the staple city over others on a certain area by requiring all wares exchanged in that area to be 
brought to the staple city, unloaded there to pay taxes, and put there for wholesale. Venetian 
Lordship of the Gulf gave Venice a staple status over the Northern Adriatic to the exclusion of 
potential competitors, especially of nearby Ferrara, Ancona, and Zara, and enabled all the 
Venetians to make a profit as middlemen on the transit trade between Europe and the East.
22 
Second, Venice provided protection from pirates and from rival cities at less cost than was 
available to others. She did so chiefly by outfitting a fleet devoted to making the seas safe for 
City merchants and renting space to all of them equally on the state-owned galleys escorted 
by that fleet.
23 Last but not least, commercial privileges secured merchants’ property rights 
abroad, reduced the punitive custom duties they must have paid otherwise, provided attractive 
lodgings and warehouses facilities, and so forth. Venice, of course, was not the only European 
polity that acquired possessions and legal rights in the Mediterranean, but she proved 
particularly successful in assuring commercial privileges to all her merchants and in 
excluding others from this advantageous trade.
24 
From as early as the late eleventh century the Venetians enjoyed a competitive 
advantage over others in the Byzantine Empire, including native merchants who paid a 10 
percent tax on trading transactions from which all the Venetians were exempted. They had 
                                                      
21 Inter-community litigation, although possible, was particularly costly and time-consuming (Greif, Institutions). 
22 Lane, Venice, pp. 58-63. 
23 Ibid, pp.125 and 145-46. 
24 The main references in English are Ibid, pp. 23-43 and 73-85 and Norwich, History, pp. 65-147.   7
won their privileged position in 1082 in return for their naval aid against the Normans and 
kept on using their naval strength to persuade the Byzantine emperors to renew and even 
extend their privileges.
25 Furthermore, Venice leading role in the Fourth Crusade assured the 
Venetians a trading monopoly in the subsequently constituted Latin Empire of 
Constantinople— the former Byzantine Empire— from 1205 to 1261. Contrary to the 
Genoese colonization, which was the work of private consortiums, the ruler of Venice 
himself, doge Enrico Dandolo, negotiated the transport contract with the crusaders for the 
Venetians as a whole, committed at least half of all the Venetians fit for fighting to service for 
a year with the crusades and led the assault on Constantinople.
26  
Venetian commercial penetration into Muslim territories was also facilitated by the 
grant of privileges. For example, the predominance of Venetian merchants in Alexandria 
during  the first half of the thirteenth century responded to their privileged position there from  
                                                      
25 In 1082 the Byzantine emperor Alexius I Comnenus liberated the Venetians from all tariffs in most cities, 
granted them whole districts in Constantinople and Durazzo, and gave a tribute to the Venetian church of St. 
Mark, the more acceptable as it was raised from a tax on their rivals of Amalphi. In 1099 the Venetians, who had 
at first refused to join the First Crusade, assembled the largest fleet that had ever sailed from Italy to the East 
after the Pisans occupied the Byzantine island of Corfu and forced the remnants of the Pisan crusading fleet to 
stop any trade within the Empire. In 1120 the Venetians concealed under the cover of a holy Crusade a punitive 
expedition against the Byzantines, whose emperor John II Comnenus had recently suspended their lucrative 
privileges. Apart from inflicting a crushing defeat on the Fatimid army just off Ascalon in 1123, marking the 
beginning of the Italian naval domination of the entire Mediterranean and obtaining as reward the exemption 
from all taxes and a commercial quarter in every town in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Venetians raided 
the Byzantine parts of the Aegean and the Adriatic, forcing the emperor to restore their privileges.  
To check Venetian domination, the Byzantine emperors repeatedly tried to replace the Venetians with the 
Genoese and the Pisans under less favorable terms. Most notably, Manuel I Comnenus signed treaties with 
Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170 in which tariffs were reduced from 10 to 4 percent— as opposed to the 
total exemption for the Venetians— and had all the Venetians who were in the Empire arrested on a single day 
(12 March 1171) and their goods impounded. However, the Byzantines found the Genoese and the Pisans no 
better to deal with than the Venetians and, accordingly, expelled the formers from Constantinople in 1182 and 
allowed the latter to return to the city in 1183. In the meanwhile, the Venetians concentrated on the recently open 
and very profitable trade with Alexandria. 
26 Venice thus became the Lord of One Quarter and a Half of a Quarter of the Roman Empire and actually took 
possession over a chain of naval enclaves that formed the basis for her maritime supremacy in the eastern 
Mediterranean from that time forward. The Venetians also obtained the right to trade free of all controls and 
requisitions, without paying a tax, and under her own law over the whole Empire, from which both the Genoese 
and the Pisans were to be rigorously excluded.   
In 1261 Genoa assisted the Byzantines to recover Constantinople in return for the latter’s promise to expel the 
Venetians from that city and to grant them favored status there. Yet, the Venetians were readmitted in 1268 and 
the Genoese obtained a suburb across the Golden Horn in Pera, rather than the docks in Constantinople itself that 
the Venetians had possessed since the eleventh century. Moreover, while the Genoese were in favor with the 
Byzantines at Constantinople and in the Black Sea area, the Venetians continued to exert substantial influence on 
the eastern Mediterranean and became the closest trade partners of the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, by then the most 
profitable trading region.   8
about 1200.
27 Furthermore, the Venetians, unlike the Genoese and then the Catalans, resisted 
engaging in piracy raids on Muslim shipping and ports and used Venice skilful diplomacy to 
extract more and more special privileges from the Mamluks, who ruled Egypt and then Syria 
from 1250 to 1517. As a result, Venetian trade expanded, whereas Genoese and Catalan trade 
decreased.
28  
2.2.  Political Restrictions on Entry 
Exclusive commercial privileges, protected convoys, and staple rights created 
economic rents to which only Venetian merchants had access, thereby inducing them to keep 
their City affiliation and enabling them to credibly commit not to embezzle the investors’ 
capital outright. Economic rents thus generated effective barriers to exit but attracted labor 
and capital, which, unless constrained, would have congested the market and forced rents 
down. To sustain the rents on which Venetian institution for contract enforcement was based, 
the state introduced political barriers to foreign and domestic entry. 
As we have seen, foreigners were strictly barred from Venetian privileged trading. In 
addition, they were outlawed to testify against a Venetian, which impaired their ability to rely 
on the state for their contracts enforcement and discouraged their investments in Venetian 
trade.
29 Yet, as long as a foreigner investor could assure a Venetian merchant that their 
bilateral relation would last for a long time and that the latter’s share on profits would be 
higher than it was customary among the Venetians, he could be certain that the Venetian 
merchant would both agree to do business with him and repay his debts. During the late 
thirteenth century foreigners were thus prohibited to appoint Venetians as agents or otherwise 
use their names to avoid taxes or participate in business reserved for Venetian citizens. To 
                                                      
27 Jacoby estimates that the vast majority of the 3000 Italian merchants or so present in Alexandria during 1215-
1216 were Venetians (“Dimensione,” p. 690). Like other naval powers, Venice had obtained a fondaco― a 
walled enclosure that served as a combined warehouse and hostel― in Alexandria in the 1170s but, unlike her 
competitors, Venice gained a second fondaco and the privilege to have consular representation in the city in 
1208. Among other things, Venetian consuls were in charge to adjudicate disputes among Venetian merchants 
and between Venetians and other Latins. New privileges were granted in 1238 and renewed in 1244. Local 
(Ayyubid) rulers in Syria granted privileges to the Venetians in 1207/1208, 1225, 1229 and 1254. 
28 Venetian trade with Egypt and Syria was able to continue under Mamluk rule (1250-1517) on the basis of 
privileges granted in 1254 and 1289, respectively. After the fall of Acre in 1291, the popes prohibited trade with 
the Mamluks but the Venetians did not implement the ban except for the period 1323-1345 and then complied 
with it only partially: the Venetian lucrative trade with the Mamluks continued by way of the intermediate ports 
of Cyprus and Lesser Armenia. In 1370 Venice actually secured a general peace with the Mamluks, which 
permitted the Venetians to dominate European trade in Alexandria and to develop and expanding trade in cotton 
with Syria.  
29 An 1162 document reads that “according to the custom of the court of the doge, no one except a Venetian can 
testify against a Venetian” (Roberto, 1906, p. 23. See also, Besta and Predelli, “Statutti,” p. 67).   9
enforce these laws, colonial governors were ordered to check all commercial contracts within 
their jurisdictions and to verify the merchants’ financial statements.
30 
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries immigrants were required to reside and pay 
taxes in Venice for ten years to become citizens. This is in sharp contrast with most other 
medieval cities, where naturalization required only one year of residence, without tax-paying. 
In 1305 regulations concerning admission to citizenship were tighten. Immigrants needed then 
to reside and pay taxes for 25 years before ranking as Venetians in shipping merchandise and 
paying customs in overseas trade. At the same time Genoa, with a slightly smaller population, 
granted full citizenship by three years of residence.
31  
The 1305 regulations also established that out of the individuals born in Venice only 
those who could claim three generations of Venetian descendant and who had never engaged 
in “mechanical” labor were to be considered original citizens or citizens-by-birth. Thus, after 
almost three centuries of population growth hindered by trade expansion in which significant 
numbers of new men were able to acquire economic and political prominence, the vast 
majority of Venice residents were excluded from the ranks of citizens allowed to trade and 
invest overseas.
32  
Also, at various points during the fourteenth century when overabundance of 
Levantine products in Venice was eroding profits, Venetian merchants were prohibited to 
import Levantine wares of more value than their assessed patrimony in the estimo, on the 
basis of which they contributed forced loans.
33 The evidence indicates, however, that the 
Officium de Navigantibus, the newly established magistracy in charge of enforcing the law, 
did not curtail commercial credit among citizens-by-birth but it rather restricted investments 
in overseas trade made by foreigners and recently naturalized citizens.
34 An investment 
ceiling had in fact been applied to naturalized citizens in 1318 and the rule that new citizens 
could not invest in maritime commerce sums exceeding the amount of personal wealth for 
which they were assessed for fiscal purpose was maintained after the demise of the Officium 
                                                      
30 Jacoby, “Venezia,” p. 291; and Lane, Venice, p. 140. 
31 Caravale, “Istituzioni,” pp. 304-12; Jacoby, “Dimensione;” Lane, Venice, pp. 151-52; and Lopez, “Trade,” p. 
333 and 348. The 1305 regulation distinguished between full citizenship and half citizenship. The latter entailed 
immigrants to Venetian trade privileges within the city after fifteen years of tax-paying residence. Contrary to 
the Genoese liberal policy in granting colonial citizenship, the Venetians barely admitted foreigners to their 
colonies. 
32 Caravale, “Istituzioni,” pp. 304-12, and Lane, Venice, pp. 151-52. According to Bairoch, Batou, and Chevre, 
the city population grew steadily from about 45,000 inhabitants in 1050 to over 110,000 in 1330 (“Population”). 
Since no medieval city reproduced itself, most new inhabitants must have been immigrants. 
33 The law was in force for a few months in 1324 and for the periods 1331-38 and 1361-63. The same restrictive 
mechanism was applied in 1404 during the banking crisis to limit the bankers’ investments of depositors’ funds 
in maritime commerce (Lane, Venice, pp. 140 and 185 and Müeller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 168 and 503). 
34 Luzzatto, Storia, pp. 123-24; Lane “Recent Studies,” p. 138; and Müeller, Venetian Money Market, p. 503.   10
de Navigantibus in 1363 and the definitive lifting of investment’s quotas for original 
citizens.
35 
The identification of these political barriers to entry as essential elements of the 
Venetian institution for contract enforcement thus helps explain the distinctiveness and timing 
of the Venetian legislation. Governed by the state, the Venetians needed both to reserve to 
themselves the rents of their privileged trade and to maintain these rents high by restricting 
access to citizenship and limiting the supply of Levantine wares in Venice when competition 
was pushing rents down. 
2.3.  Verifiable Information 
Economic rents induced merchants not to change destination once en-route and never 
return to Venice. However, even if turning back to the city, merchants could still breach their 
contracts, for example, by falsely reporting a small profit and embezzling the difference. To 
reward honest merchants and punish cheaters, the state needed to know when and to what 
extent a contract had been violated. Tight administrative controls over trade provided the 
(verifiable) information required to adjudicate commercial disputes. Since evidence on this 
respect has been presented in detail somewhere else, a brief summary will suffice here.
36 State 
delegates in the Venetian colonies abroad, scribes en-route, and public brokers in Venice 
increasingly monitored commercial ventures in each and all of their phases, thereby 
generating verifiable information which the parties could present in disputes. The resulting 
enhanced state's ability to verify information, however, did not crystallize all at once, but it 
rather developed incrementally as overseas trade became well-established throughout the 
Venetian enclaves in the East and trading voyages were organized in state's round convoys 
from Venice to her colonies. As a result, the commenda contract progressively replaced the 
sea loan as the twelfth century turned to its close and prevailed by the third decade of the 
thirteenth century, when Venice consolidated her commercial and colonial Empire in the East.  
2.4.  Judicial Enforcement and Exclusion 
The state could thus inflict sanctions on returning merchants known to be in bad 
standing. Another issue is whether the state was willing to do so. As it has already been 
mentioned, the state discriminated against foreigners but, at least in theory, provided the 
                                                      
35 Müeller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 151, 265, 503 and 616; and Hocquet, “Mecannismi,” pp. 573 and 595-
96. 
36 González de Lara, “Institutions.”   11
Venetians “a responsible justice equal to all.”
37 According to Lane, the Venetian system of 
law had in fact a high reputation of impartiality.
38 The existing evidence indicates that the 
state indeed used its legal and administrative powers to punish City merchants found guilty of 
having violated their financial agreements with other Venetians. 
On the one hand, offending merchants were subject to the legal seizure of their 
properties within Venetian jurisdiction. The Statutes of the City, which basically endorsed the 
prevailing custom, established, probably in 1192, that court sentences be fulfilled within eight 
days during which the offender could neither leave Venice nor dispose of his goods. If a 
debtor failed to pay in full or otherwise arrive at an agreement with his creditors within that 
time, he ought to be incarcerated in court for a month and thereafter in prison for another 
month. After these two months, the sequestration of his goods was to proceed.
39 Litigation 
over various commenda contracts indeed resulted in the forced sale of the merchant’s real 
property in 1195 and in the transfer of the possession of a particular property from the 
guarantor to the plaintiff in 1226. Another case from 1241 shows that the Doge and his court 
auctioned the personal property of a deceased merchant and, because the amount retrieved 
was insufficient to fully satisfy his creditors, the merchant’s house was publicly sold.
40 
Furthermore, confiscation of real property due to failed credits was also extended to 
properties in the colonies. For example, in 1178 Leone Falier gave power of attorney to act 
against one of his debtors’ property in the Venetian colony at Tyre.
41 Evidence on a few 
successful legal actions notwithstanding, attempts to collect defaulters’ assets might prove 
                                                      
37 Promissione of doge Giacomo Tiepolo, 1229, cited in Besta and Predelli, “Statuti,” p. 60.  
38 Lane, Venice, p. 251. See also Gasparini, “Venice,” and Norwich, Venice, p. 151. 
39 Besta and Predelli, “Statuti,” St. Enrico Dandolo, c. 36. See also c.7-14 and c.73.  
40 See, respectively, MRL, Documenti, # 424, 626, and 743. For evidence on the merchant’s prohibition to 
administer his property before settling his legal disputes, see Ibid. # 466; 630-31; and 853; and MRL, Nuovi 
Documenti, # 20 and 41. For the legal seizure of real property due to failed loans, see MRL, Documenti, # 76, 
174 and 175; 176; 281-83; and 528. For the existence of a very active market for rights over alienated property, 
see Ibid. # 281; 424; 554, 556, 557 and 581; and 624 and 844. The court helped enforce contracts even under 
extreme circumstances. In 1170 the brothers Marco and Pietro Giustiniani had financed Vitale Bembo for his 
disastrous trip to Constantinople, where his property was impounded by order of the Byzantine emperor Manuel 
Comnenus.  Since Vitale had received funds through a sea loan, he was exempted from re-payment. However, 
twenty years later the Byzantine emperor Issaaco sent compensation for damages, thereby reversing the outcome 
of Vitale's venture from loss to profit. On request of the brothers Giustiniani, the Doge and his court ordered that 
their credit be fully satisfied before delivering any compensation to Vitale (Ibid. # 466). 
41 Ibid. # 295. See # 783 for a 1247 document revealing the similarities between courts in Venice and 
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fruitless.
42 In that case, the City Statutes established the garnishment of one-third of the 
debtor’s future income until completing the payment.
43 
On the other hand, merchants with a pending debt were barred both from holding any 
public office and from entering the marketplace of the Rialto and the administrative and 
judicial site of San Marco, which in all effect excluded them from doing business.
44 Besides, 
they faced the prospect of being denied permission to join the convoys organized and 
protected by the state. The existing contractual evidence for the thirteenth century indicates 
that the parties indeed expected the state to select the personnel of the trading fleets. A 1242 
commenda contract reports that a merchant had received an amount   
… to do business with by sea and by land … if [he] will be among those chosen 
men who are chosen according to the decree given by the lord Doge and his 
council; and if [he] will not be among those chosen, [he] will have the power to 
commit that merchandise or a part of it, with the witness of good men or with a 
charter, to some or to someone among those chosen.
45 
More generally, over half of the 261 thirteenth-century trading contracts make explicit 
the merchant’s requirement to obtain a licentiam from the Doge and his council.
46  
2.5.  A Limited Government 
In sum, the state― an impartial third-party enforcer that created economic rents and a 
legal system, established political barriers to entry, generated and transmitted verifiable 
information, and punished cheaters― supported the operation of financial markets among the 
Venetians. Why did the state behave the way it did? To understand the reasons underlying the 
state observed behavior, one must turn to the political system. First, Venice governing 
                                                      
42 For example, in 1249 the heirs of a certain Giacomo Mudaccio started a lawsuit to get payment for an overdue 
commenda his father had financed in 1221. At the time of the indictment, the merchant in arrears had also died 
and his heir Bartholotta declared herself insolvent. In 1254 Giacomo’s sons acquired legal rights over whatever 
property Bartholotta might have, but no property or goods were found (Ibid.  # 822). 
43 Besta and Predelli, eds. “Statuti,” St. Enr. Dandolo, c.36. 
44Castagneti, “Primo Commune,” p.101; Lane, Venice, p.143; and Müeller, Venetian Money Market, pp. 124-25. 
Although there is no evidence on the exclusion of deceitful merchants from Venetian privileges abroad, Venetian 
tight administrative controls over her colonies could have been used for that purpose. The Civil and the Maritime 
Statutes indeed established that colonial governors made sure that merchants were subject to the same rules and 
regulations abroad as in Venice itself (Besta and Predelli, eds. “Statuti,” St. Enr. Dandolo, 1192, c.40, and 
Predelli and Sacerdoti, eds. “Statuti Marittimi,” St. Tiepolo, 1229, c.45 and c.52 and St. Zeno, 1255, c.86 and 
c.98).  
45 MRL, Documenti, # 752 and 753. The translation is from Pryor, “Mediterranean Commerce,” p. 141. 
46 MRL, Documenti  and  Nuovi Documenti. This practice is first documented in 1200 and prevailed by the 
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structures reduced each office holder’s space of strategies in a way that curbed his ability to 
use the state power in his own interest at the expense of the rest of the society. Second, a 
vigilant oversight over state activity supported a system of punishments and rewards that 
made each office holder’s best strategy not to abuse his (limited) power or shirk from his 
duty. 
During the eighth century the residents of the Venetian lagoon established themselves 
as an autonomous political unit, at the top of which was the doge. At first, the doge was an 
elected monarch of unlimited power but, starting in 1032, the doge’s prerogatives and 
freedom of action were continuously limited until he became nothing more than a magistrate. 
Doges were “leaders, no lords, nay not even leaders, but honored servants of the State.”
47 The 
actual exercise of power was carefully distributed among a large number of interlocking 
councils and magistracies whose members were elected for a brief term and were ineligible to 
succeed themselves, thereby ensuring that none of them had a large share on power, even at 
the cost of losing some executive efficiency.
48  
Unlike modern limited governments, the division of power in Venice ignored 
completely the separation of the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions. Instead, 
various governing bodies were given overlapping jurisdictions so that each council or 
magistracy was checked by some other council or magistracy as to assure the rule of law. 
Within each magistracy or officia, the clerks exercised mutual monitoring and rendered 
various sets of accounts on the basis of which performance was evaluated. Besides, every 
official, including the Doge, was subject to strict independent reviews after his office came to 
term and was liable to prosecution for abuse of his office or dereliction of duty by a 
distinctively Venetian group of officials, the State Attorneys, who had investigating powers 
and to whom all office holders were to notify any observed wrongdoing.
49 
Severe punishment for failing duty was applied to all Venetian officials. All office 
holders had to give an oath of impartiality and good behavior and were subjected to both hefty 
monetary sanctions and retirement from office if caught in whatever kind of fraud. For 
example, any official found guilty of having “put his hands in the state’s goods” had to pay 
back the amount taken plus a fine of half the amount within three days from the conviction. In 
                                                      
47 Petrarch, in a letter of May, 1355, cited by Lane, Venice, p. 181. 
48 For a concise description of the organization of Venice governing structures and their evolution over time, see 
Gasparini, “Venice.” See also, Castagnetti, “Comune;” Gaspari, “Orseolo;” and Lane, Venice, pp. 88-117. For a 
comparison with the Genoese political system, see Greif, “Political Organizations.” 
49 See Lane, Venice, pp. 95 and 251, and Gasparini, “Venice.” See Stahl, Zecca, pp. 245-297 for an excellent 
overview of the application of these disciplinary mechanisms to the internal operation of the mint.    14
addition, he was to be banned for ever from the specific office in which he embezzled the 
money and, if the amount taken was relatively high, from holding any public office.
50  
On the other hand, good performance ensured the continuation of a very profitable 
public life. Although the same man could not serve in the same council or magistracy for two 
consecutive terms, nothing prevented an individual to rotate through the most important 
offices. Before the end of the twelfth century the selection of men for councils and 
magistracies consisted of two parts: nomination by a committee whose members were chosen 
by lot, thereby curtailing each faction’s ability to influence the outcome of the election, and 
approval by the Great Council, thereby ensuring that corrupt and/or incompetent people 
would not be elected. Public clerks were directly chosen by the councils or magistrates who 
needed them and their re-election was tied to the auditing of accounts.
  Furthermore, all 
officers charged with enforcing regulations were induced to diligence by receipt of a portion 
of the fines levied in addition to their salaries.
51  
2.6.  Was the State a Self-Enforcing Institution? 
Asserting that Venice distinctive limited government constrained political agents to 
protect rather than abuse the contract and property rights required for the operation of 
financial markets hides a key question. Why did Venetian prominent families and the doge in 
particular support the existing economic and political institutions instead of attempting to 
establish an autocracy? After all, autocracy is a most profitable occupation, welfare losses 
notwithstanding.
  
This paper tentatively argues that the Venetians were motivated to support rather than 
challenge the state by the belief that cooperating to render the polity of Venice conducive to 
trade would ensure each of them a fair share in the gains from their collective action while 
any attempt to subvert Venice limited government would be successfully resisted  and 
penalized with capital punishment. This belief was rendered self-enforcing by the operation of 
the state, which, on the one hand, generated economic and political rents and allocated them 
among all Venetian citizens fairly and, on the other hand, guaranteed a balance of power 
among all the important Venetian families, thereby making it impossible for any one family 
or group to attain unchallenged supremacy. Given the gains the Venetians expected to gain 
from supporting the prevailing institutions and the fear of becoming victims of autocratic 
                                                      
50 Stahl, Zecca, p. 271. This 1359 law basically standardized the punishment for embezzlement of state goods.  
To make sure that it was enforced, the State Attorneys were given the right to sell the property of the convicted 
official. For a 1385 case in which this procedures was applied to a noble, see Ibid. p. 261. Evidence on the 
payment of fines for breaking the law dates back to at least the mid-twelfth century (MRL, Documenti, # 143, 
163, 226 and 402). More generally, see Lane, Venice, pp. 98-100. 
51 Lane, Venice, pp. 98 and 100, and Gasparini, “Venice.”   15
extraction, the best they could do was to join together to confront anyone’s attempt to make 
himself a dictator and to impose on him the heaviest punishment, which in turn deterred each 
of them from trying. 
On the one hand, trading profits and political authority remained highly diffused. As 
we have seen, trade regulations and state’s control over the city and her colonies assured all 
Venetian merchants almost an equal chance to make a profit in oversea trade. Furthermore, 
any Venetian with little money to invest could obtain up to 40 percent interest on sea loans or 
three fourths of the net venture’s return on commenda contracts without adventuring overseas. 
Finally, the large number of governing bodies and high turnover in office enabled to distribute 
political power and honors widely. To make sure that no single family or faction controlled 
access to public life, campaigning for office was outlawed, the selection of men for important 
offices was delegated to nominating committees whose members were chosen by lot, and no 
family was allowed more than one member on any such committee or office.
52  
To preserve the economic and political rents that rendered the institutional foundations 
of markets self-enforcing and to make the state more likely to be an equilibrium, the 
Venetians established barriers to entry and created intergenerational links. Between the end of 
the thirteenth century and the early years of the fourteenth century, those families who had 
taken active part in political life during the former century became a hereditary aristocracy, 
whose male members of age would henceforth exercise a monopoly over political activity. 
This, of course, deprived the vast majority of Venice residents from any political power, but 
assured all the members of the existing ruling class that they and their offspring would 
continue enjoying economic and political rents.
53 Furthermore, Venice dwellers that were at 
the time comfortably well-off but who they themselves or their forefathers had not sat in the 
Great Council during the previous century, and were hence excluded from the aristocracy, 
soon came to form an hereditary privileged class of citizens-by-birth, who were admitted to 
foreign trade with almost the same rights as the patricians and from whose ranks all the public 
clerks were to be chosen.
  Nobles and citizens had all much the same interests and, although 
they did not obviously treat common people below the rank of citizens as well as they treated 
themselves, they nonetheless granted them economic rights according to the guilds to which 
they belonged.
54 
On the other hand, a broadly equal dispersion of economic and political power made it 
imprudent for any leader or group to attempt to overpower the others. After the ignominious 
                                                      
52 Lane, Venice, pp. 98, 100 and 110; Gasparini, “Venice;” and Stahl, pp. 245-97. For the tortuous procedure for 
appointing the doge, see Norwich, History, 166-67, and Greif, “Political Organization,” pp. 738-39. 
53 Lane refers to the process as the enlargement of the Great Council (Venice, p. 111). According to Chojnacki, it 
was “an act less of exclusion than of inclusion” (“Search,” p. 56). For an opposite view, see Rösch, “Serrata..” 
54 Lane, Venice, pp. 151-52, and Gasparini, “Venice.”   16
endeavor by doge Domenico Orseolo to seize power in 1032 and the subsequent 
constitutional reform, there were only two attempts in over seven hundred years to subvert 
Venice limited government.
55 Both occurred at times of exceptional distress. Both miserably 
failed. In 1310 Bajamonte Tiepolo, taking advantage of the disruptions caused by the papal 
excommunication of the City and the general discontent with the ruling doge, led a plot to 
overthrow the doge and establish himself and his followers as despots in the Venetian 
domains.
56 Bajamonte was generously sentenced to exile in Dalmatia for fear of provoking a 
civil war if otherwise, but his house was razed to the ground and on its site it was raised a 
Column of Infamy bearing the inscription: This land was the property of Bajamonte// And 
now, through his infamous betrayal,// Is held by the Commune as a lesson to others // So let 
these words proclaim to all, for ever.
57 In 1355, after the “most disastrous decade Venetians 
had ever known,” the doge Marin Falier was discovered conspiring to slaughter most of the 
nobility and make himself an autocrat.
58 He was beheaded according to due process of law 
and his portrait in the Hall of the Great Council was substituted with a black curtain reading 
“Here is the place of Marin Falier, beheaded for his crimes.” Subsequent doges were 
followed in official procession by a sword-bearing symbolic executioner as a reminder of the 
punishment intended for any leader who attempted to assume dictatorial powers.
59 
3.  Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Theory and Evidence 
The previous section presents the state as a self-sustaining institution for contract 
enforcement, i.e. as an institutional equilibrium in which financial relations took place. Yet, 
game theory warns us of the possibility of multiple equilibria. Can we discern, on the basis of 
the observed relations, whether the state was the most relevant institution in early Venetian 
trade? Can we generate predictions based on the assumption that the state provided effective 
                                                      
55 The Venetians governed themselves essentially through the same institutions they had developed from the 
eleventh to the early-fourteenth centuries until the Napoleonic invasion in 1797.  
56 The papal interdict brought Venetian trade almost to a halt. According to Norwich, “in every corner of Europe 
and a large part of Asia, Venetian goods were seized, Venetian assets confiscated, and Venetian ships attacked 
and plunder” (History, pp.188-89). Besides, doge Pietro Gradenigo was detested by some rich and able men who 
found themselves permanently debarred from political advancement by the closure of the Great Council in 1297. 
57 Norwich, History, p. 195. In addition the good name and reputation of his family was systematically 
destroyed.  
58 The quotation is from Lane, Venice, p. 179. The Black Death had cut the city population by three fifth and had 
extinguished at least 50 noble families (out of about 200) during the years 1347-49 (Lane, Venice, p. 173 and 
Norwich, History, p. 214). Such a high mortality might have likely caused a decrease in the time discount factor 
and hence might have undermined the reputation mechanism underlying the state. Also, Venice had been 
defeated in 1354 by Genoa which, like most other Italian cities at the time, was under the rule of a Signore. 
According to Lane, Marin Falier was impelled not by personal ambition or hatred to the class that had put him in 
office, but by the conviction that despots were more successful in war than republics (Lane, Venice, p. 183). 
59Gasparri, Venice, Norwich, History, p. 299, and Olson, Power, p. 40.   17
contract enforcement and confirm them empirically? Can we account for other trade-related 
phenomena under this assumption? Affirmative answers would further substantiate the 
hypothesis that financial relations were indeed governed by the state. 
To answer these questions, I use the 969 notary acts fully-transcribed by Morozzo de 
la Rocca and Lombardo for the period 1021-1261 in which 435 sea loans and commenda 
contracts involving 543 individuals are mentioned.
60 To better interpret the Venetian scattered 
and notary-biased evidence, I confront it with secondary studies based upon Genoese notary 
records of the twelfth century, most notably with the work by Greif on the entire cartulary of 
John the Scribe for the years 1155-1164 in which 612 contracts involving 479 individuals 
were annotated (see table 1).
61  
TABLE 1.  
Genoa versus Venice 
 





Time Period  1155-1164 1021-1261 
Documents  entire cartulary
  455 (out of 969) 
notarial acts 
Contracts (sea loan and commenda)  612  435 
Traders
1   479 543 
Investors   180 (37.5 %)  334 (61.5 %) 
Merchants   335 (69.9 %)  233 (42.9 %) 
Families
2  ? 320 
Investor’s Families   about 34  221 (69.0 %) 
Merchant’s Families   229    59 (49.6 %) 
Intra Family Relations  6.45 % of capital  10 % 
Average merchants per investor
3  1.57 2.25 
Average investors per merchant
3  Close to 1  4.57 
Non-Genoese/Non-Venetian 
    Investors 
    Merchants 
 
 





Source: For Genoa, Greif, “Contract Enforceability”, “Cultural Beliefs,”and Institutions.  For Venice, the author based on 
Morozzodella Rocca and Lomabrdo, Documenti and Nuovi Documenti. 
 
1 ‘Traders’ refers to the individuals who originally entered into a contractual relation. In the Genoese and the Venetian 
sources, 36 and 24 traders, respectively, performed as both an investor and a traveling merchant. 
2 In terms of Venetian families, 60 out of the known 320 trader’s families have members who acted as investors and members 
who acted as merchants.
 
3 Excluding investors/merchants who appear only once as such. 
 
                                                      
60 MRL, Documenti and Nuovi Documenti. This evidence constitutes a very partial listing. First, since cartularies 
did not stand as legal proof in Venice until well-entered the thirteenth century, none has been preserved. All 
Venetian evidence comes from the few original notary acts and their certified copies that, deposited for their safe 
keeping in monasteries or within the Procuratori di San Marco, survived fires, floods, rats and human apathy 
until they were rescued by the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. Second, data from before the mid twelfth century is 
particularly scarce: only 94 documents have been preserved. Third, since the evidence is based on notarized 
documents, it underestimates the importance of verbal and not-legally binding contracts.  
61 Greif, “Reputation”, “Contract Enforceability”, “Cultural Beliefs,” and Institutions.   18
3.1.  Social Control Systems and Ethics: the Family and the Fear of God  
Although the role of social control systems and ethics in surmounting contractual 
problems is not of course to be ignored, we cannot explain some observed patterns based on 
loyalty among family members or the fear of God.
62  
First, financial relations were not confined to the family: 89.2  percent of the 435 
Venetian contracts of sea loan and commenda were agreed upon by people without any family 
tie.
63 Since financial exchange among trustworthy relatives may have not required the 
services of a notary, this information is, however, biased. Yet, the data suggests that the 
Venetians relied on notaries under standard conditions for their inter-family relations. For 
example, various investors registered their loans pro amore to their close relatives with a 
notary despite its cost.
64 Even a widow lending to her own granddaughter “for the needs of her 
home” and a nun investing in his son’s voyage sought the protection of a notarized act.
65 As it 
was customary, a penalty of double payment with a 20 percent yearly interest was imposed 
for any delay and the contracts were guaranteed by a pledge of the entire debtor’s present and 
future property. These clauses were far from purely decorative, as demonstrated by the many 
cases in which unsatisfied creditors executed the collateral to get payment of double the 
amount due plus interests, regardless of kinship bonds.
66  
Furthermore, contrary to the Genoese experience, the rate of interfamily financial 
relations declined over time: whereas roughly 40 percent of the contracts for overseas trade 
were entered by members of the same family during the eleventh century, only 7 percent of 
the sea loans and commenda contracts signed during the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries 
were agreed upon relatives.
67 The evidence thus supports the view that, despite potential 
                                                      
62 Impure altruism is not here considered, although certain internalized values might have also constrained 
merchant’s behavior. In Venice merchants did not form a distinctive and antagonist class from their financiers, 
but they all form a quite cohesive society with a common interest in commerce. As we have seen financial 
relations were very flexible: investors of all means, ranks and occupations funded wealthy and poor merchants 
alike. Excluding the merchants who appear only once, and could not hence show up performing both roles, 36 
percent of the merchants invested in other merchants’ ventures and over 72 percent of the 83 merchant’s families 
who appear twice or oftener had members who acted as merchants and members who acted as investors. 
63 Two individuals are considered to be family members if the contract mentions that they are relatives, if they 
have the same surname or if there is any evidence indicating they were relatives. 
64 MRL, Nuovi Documenti, # 90 and 104. 
65 Ibid. Documenti, # 146, and Ibid. # 356. 
66 For the legal seizure of collateral involving close relatives, see MRL, Nuovi Documenti, # 38. More generally, 
see the references in footnote 40. For the application of a penalty for late payment in financial contracts, see 
MRL, Documenti, # 28, 114, 307, 427, 433-435, 458, and 733-34, and Ibid. Nuovi Documenti, # 3. 
  
67 The cartulary of John the Scribe (1155-164) indicates that 6.45 percent of the capital raised externally was 
entrusted to family members. Later cartularies reflect a higher rate of intra-family agency relations: about 16 
percent at the turn of the twelfth century (Greif, Institutions).   19
bonds among family members, kinship provided a limited and declining role for the 
compliance of financial contracts in Venice. 
Besides, next in kin resorted to the courts. For example, the Venetian merchant Pietro 
Badoer brought a lawsuit against his father in 1258. In 1209 Giovanni Badoer, Pedro’s father, 
had received in commenda from his “beloved” father in law, Andrea Donato, a certain 
amount, which he failed to repay. In 1224 Andrea started litigation and obtained a house of 
Giovanni’s property for compensation of his credit plus a penalty of double the amount due 
plus interests. In the same year, Andrea transferred part of his rights over the house to his 
“beloved” grandson who, in turn, sold the rights over the alienated property to Pietro Badoer. 
Pietro, who had acquired legal capacity in 1218 with the consent of his “beloved” father, saw 
nothing wrong in bringing a charge against his father over the property rights he had acquired 
in 1226 and proclaimed in court in 1230.
68 
Second, both the phraseology in which notary acts were framed and the statuary law 
suggest that the Venetians perceived divine penalties as being insufficient to curtail 
opportunistic behavior. For example, besides appealing to the fear of God, the standard 
formula under which dying merchants abroad entrusted their wares for shipment to their 
legitimate heir imposed the usually high monetary penalty for a breach of contract: 
 “if you infringe your duty or you are corrupted, let God Father Almighty and 
his Son our Lord and the Saint Spirit be against you … and let you burn in hell 
with Juda the betrayer forever and, in addition, you ought to compensate my will 
executor with five golden lire”.
69 
 
Likewise, the Maritime Statutes of the thirteenth century required all seamen to swear 
under oath that they would report the misbehavior of anyone on board but, just in case, also 
established hefty monetary sanctions for those who refused to compel with this obligation. 
Also, the early City Statutes of the late twelfth century foresaw that government officials be 
retired from office if caught in fraud, despite the  fact that they were required to give an oath 
of impartiality and good behavior upon their appointment.
70 
Furthermore, ethics alone seems unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for some 
observed phenomena. For example, young and experienced merchants alike were required to 
collateralize their debts with their entire present and future property and they relied on both 
                                                      
68 MRL, Documenti. # 625 and 844. For other intra-family litigation, see Ibid. 71 and 538; 281; 465; and 554, 
556, 557 and 581, and Nuovi Documenti, # 38. 
69 MRL, Documenti, # 362. See also  Ibid # 100, 246, 326, 535, 559, 595, 636, 661 and 731. 
70 Predelli and Sacerdoti, eds. “Statuti Marittimi” and Besta and Predelli, eds. “Statuti Civili.”   20
sea loans and commenda contracts.
71 Yet, if financial relations were based upon ethics, one 
would expect that young merchants, for whom information about their “pious” character was 
missing, were constrained to give more secured collateral than experienced merchants whose 
records demonstrated to be intrinsically “honest” and to rely more on the less conflictive sea 
loan. Also, commenda contracts exhibited an almost fix sharing rule: three fourths of the 
profit accrued to capital and the remaining one fourth remunerated labor. Yet, one would 
expect that young merchants, if exceptionally raising capital through a commenda, obtained a 
less favorable sharing rule, for investors were taking the risk of funding a “bad type,” i.e. an 
individual whose behavior was unconstrained by the fear of God.  
3.2.  Bilateral and Multilateral Reputation-based Institutions 
Private-order institutions based on reputation can potentially foster financial relations 
beyond ethics and family by enabling self-interested merchants to establish ex-ante that their 
most profitable course of action ex-post is to fulfill their contractual obligations. Under a 
bilateral reputation mechanism a merchant is motivated to honor his contracts by the carrot of 
an “efficiency wage”— a share on profits higher than what a merchant can obtain 
elsewhere— and the stick of terminating his relations with a particular investor. For a 
sufficiently high “wage,” the investor can insure that the long-run benefit an honest merchant 
can ripe from continuing this bilateral relation is larger than the short-run gain from reneging 
today. Hence, the best the merchant can do, ex-post, is to respect his contractual agreements. 
Since this is known, ex-ante, to the investor, he can trust the merchant, the merchant acquires 
a reputation for honesty, and mutually beneficial exchange occurs. 
Such a bilateral reputation mechanism seems to have prevailed in late medieval 
Genoa. Greif shows that the Genoese played bilateral reputation strategies according to which 
an investor tended to use the same merchant for a prolonged period of time and each merchant 
tended to raise funds from the same investor.
72 In the cartulary of John the Scribe, an investor 
funded, on average, 1.57 merchants.  Also, despite the fact that most families appear twice or 
oftener, members of 178 merchant’s families out of 229 (i.e. 71.6 percent) received funds 
from only one investor, or at least 90 percent of the total sum they raised externally from 
outside their family came from an specific investor (see table 1).  
                                                      
71 Typically, twelfth-century merchants used sea loans, whereas their thirteenth-century counterparts relied on 
the commenda.  Sometimes, individual merchants used both types of contract. For instance, Pietro Tiepolo raised 
funds through a commenda contract in 1182 for a return trip from Venice to Ragusa, in the Gulf of Venice, but 
used a sea loan for a much more adventurous voyage from Constantinople to Alexandria in 1184 (MRL, 
Docuemnti, # 334 and 347. As already mentioned, the choice of a particular type of contract can be linked to the 
state’s ability to verify information rather than to individual merchants’ characteristics. 
72 Greif, “Reputation”, “Contract Enforceability”,“Cultural Beliefs”, and Institutions.   21
To the contrary, the strategy played by the Venetians did not lead them to establish 
bilateral financial relations. As we have seen, diversification was pervasive. For example, 
Lazzaro Mercadante, who is named eight times in the documentation, funded seven different 
merchants to trade both in the Adriatic and in the Levant from 1242 to 1258.
73 Giovanni 
Serzi, who also appears eight times, funded four merchants voyaging on three different ships 
on a trip from Armiro to Constantinople in 1169 and one year later provided funds to other 
four merchants on similar conditions.
74 Gabriel Marignoni, the investor who appears the most 
as such, relied on nine merchants, once again the number of times he is mentioned.
75 On 
average, an investor funded 1.24 merchants, but excluding the great majority of investors who 
appear only once as such and are hence forced to rely exactly on one merchant, an investor 
financed, on average, 2.25 merchants (see table 1 and 2).  
TABLE 2. 
Presence of Venetian traders  
 











Once 252  166  0  76.98 
Twice  40 20 10  12.89 
Three  times  6 10 4  3.68 
Four  times  4 6 2  2.21 
Five  times  0 1 3  0.74 
Six  times  2 0 0  0.37 
Seven  times  3 1 0  0.74 
Eight  times  2 0 0  0.37 
Nine  times  1 2 2  0.92 
Eleven  times  0 1 1  0.37 
Fifteen  times  0 1 0  0.18 
Twenty two times  0  0  1  0.18 
Twenty  eighth  times  0 1 0  0.18 












Source: The author based on Morozzodella Rocca and Lomabrdo, Documenti and Nuovi Documenti 
 
Also, a Venetian merchant typically raised funds from various investors. On average, 
traders who functioned as merchants twice or oftener received funds from 4.57 investors and 
the more a merchant is mentioned, the more likely he raised funds from many several 
investors (see table 1). In contrast with the Genoese legislation and practice, Venetian 
merchants were allowed to amalgamate funds for a single trip without the investor’s 
permission. Thus, a certain Rodolfo Suligo gathered funds from at least fifteen investors for a 
                                                      
73 MRL, Documenti, #  746, 759,764, 771, 793, 831, 839, and 843. 
74 Ibid. # 214-217 and 219-223. 
75 Ibid., # 694, 701, 707, 709, 711, 715, 745, 809, 820, and 842.   22
sea venture he undertook in 1234.
76 Similarly, the noble Tomasso Viadro relied on at least 
four investors to finance a trading voyage on the Adriatic Sea in 1202, on two different ones 
to fund a round trip from Venice to Alexandria in 1205, and yet on another two investors for a 
Levantine venture in 1208.
77 Lane concluded that “a typical cargo probably represented the 
stakes of something like a hundred investors who had confided sums of various amounts to 
more than a dozen traveling merchants”.
78 Likewise, the evidence shows that merchants 
received funds from many different investors along their trading careers. Particularly 
revealing are the stories of the two best documented merchants. Romano Mairano— who is 
mentioned 49 times as a merchant and 3 times as an investor— raised capital from 43 
individuals belonging to 35 families.
79 Domenico Gradenigo entered into 28 commenda 
contracts with various members of his family and with 14 other investors, of whom only two 
(that is 14.2 percent) financed him repeatedly.
80  
Contrary to the Genoese practice, trust relations appear to have been established even 
when the merchants knew beforehand that the present value of their future interaction with a 
particular investor would be small. The 612 annotations of John the Scribe report only 180 
investors, 12 of whom contributed more than 40 percent of the total amount invested in the 
Genoese trade.
81 In Venice the situation was rather different: the 435 preserved sea loan and 
commenda contracts mention as many as 334 investors, several of whom are known to be 
minors, nuns, artisans, and humble people who most likely invested sporadically small sums 
in overseas trade (see table 1). The difference remains striking even if accounting for potential 
family ties: whereas 37  families contributed 90 percent of the capital raised in Genoa, the 
Venetian source mentions as many as 221 different investors’ families, the majority of whom 
appear only once in the documentation (see table 1 and 2).
82  
In sum, the observations that financial relations were typically of short duration and 
that financiers of all means funded merchants with whom they had no family-ties and with 
whom they hardly expected to interact in the future indicate that financial relations went 
beyond those that can theoretically be sustained by the family or by a bilateral reputation 
                                                      
76 MRL, Documenti, #  675-690 and 804. 
77 MRL, Nuovi Documenti, # 56-59, 64-66, and 73-74. 
78 Lane, Venice, p. 52. 
79 MRL, Documenti,#  99, 104, 112, 116, 118, 122, 124, 127, 128, 130-132, 154, 155, 157, 167, 182, 183, 188-
190, 193-198, 201, 203, 228, 231, 247, 248, 256, 261, 267, 278, 284, 285, 293, 294, 306, 309, 310, 312, 318, 
323, 329, 335, 345, 381, 383, 384, 385, 387, 447. See also Ibid. # 191, 207, and 321. 
80 In terms of investing families, apart from his own, Domenico raised funds from ten different families, four of 
whom provided him capital twice or oftener. MRL, Documenti, # 475, 488, 489, 494-498, 505, 506, 511, 512, 
524, 525, 545, 549, 554-558, 563, 569, 571, 573, 575, 587-588, 601-605, 620, 633, 642, 670, 736, and 744 and 
Ibid. Nuovi Documenti, # 80. 
81 Greif, “Cultural Beliefs,” p. 928. 
82 Greif, Institutions. The Venetian source does not provide consistent information on the amounts invested.   23
mechanism. These observations, though, are consistent with the operation of the state as an 
institution for contract enforcement. Since a merchant who considers cheating a particular 
investor risks loosing future economic rents and, possibly, his property within the Venetian 
territory, the merchant’s choice of action will be independent of the ex ante known length and 
value of his future relation with a particular investor.  
Short term relations of little value can theoretically be enforced also by informal 
institutions based on multilateral reputation. A multilateral reputation mechanism differs from 
a bilateral one in that an investor is expected to stop his relations with a merchant who 
cheated any other investor even if he himself was not cheated by that merchant. Since a 
merchant is induced to honor his contracts by the expectation that cheating would lead to the 
termination of his relations with all the members of the group among which the mechanism 
prevails, the merchant’s behavior will be rather robust to the present value of his future 
association with a particular investor.  
Yet, such an informal community enforcement mechanism is at odds with the 
observed investments by individuals who had no control over the ventures they financed. As 
Venetian investors were not actively engaged in business, information regarding the 
merchant’s conduct was not generated as a by-product of the commercial activity. Without an 
essentially free mechanism for information transmission, investors would not exercise costly 
monitoring to the benefit of the community and would hence lack the information required to 
practice collective punishment.  
Indeed, the Venetian data indicates that investors did not participate in the venture’s 
management. Besides a number of investors whose main occupation is known to have been 
other than long-distance commerce and the difficulties that a merchant might have 
encountered in following instructions from the many investors who typically fund each 
merchant, there is no evidence whatsoever that Venetian investors were involved in 
management. Since commenda contracts in other localities frequently bound the merchant to 
bring back from precise localities certain specified wares and to follow whatever instructions 
he received by letter or by messenger from the investing party, the absence of any such 
reference in Venice suggests the independent character of the Venetian merchant.
83 Moreover, 
in contrast with the statuary law of Barcelona, Marseilles, Pisa, and the Genoese colony of 
Pera, the Statutes of Venice treat both the sea loan and the commenda as titles of credit.
84 
Luzzatto thus concludes that Venetian investors had no control over the ventures they 
financed.
85  
                                                      
83 See Luzzatto, Studi, pp. 70-71 and Storia, pp. 82-84; and de Roover, “Organization of Trade,” p. 50. 
84 See Pryor, “Mediterranean Commerce,” p. 155, and Luzzatto, Studi, pp.70-71.  
85 Luzzatto, Studi, p.72, cited in p. 4 of this paper.    24
In this respect the Venetians differed essentially from the celebrated Maghribi traders, 
who indeed practiced multilateral punishment. Greif shows that social ties and business 
relations within the Maghribi coalition provided an essentially costless network for 
information-transmission which, in turn, determined the coalition’s boundaries. Trust 
relations among the Maghribies were hence limited to a relatively narrow group of business 
associates who personally engaged in the trades they financed, as demonstrated by the many 
letters in which the investor requested information or mentioned that he was expecting to 
receive additional information before making a business decision.
86  
In sum, financial relations in Venice went beyond those that can be theoretically 
sustained by a multilateral reputation mechanism, but were consistent with the operation of 
the state. Like the Maghribi coalition, the Venetian state provided third-party enforcement, 
thereby enabling financial relations which the parties knew ahead of time would be of short 
duration and little value. Unlike the Maghribi traders, the Venetians relied on the state to both 
generate verifiable information which the parties could present in disputes and to punish 
cheaters, thereby enabling investments from persons without business experience.  
3.3.   State-based Institutions for Contract Enforcement 
As we have seen, the state was both unwilling to provide impartial third-party contract 
enforcement to non-Venetians and unable to punish foreigners outside its domains. Therefore, 
if he state actually governed financial relations, we would expect to observe prevalently intra-
Venetian relations.
87 The Venetian source is particularly suitable to evaluate this prediction 
because, on the one hand, it covers a period prior to the introduction of political barriers to 
foreign capital and, on the other hand, the documented acts were written in the most disparate 
markets, from one to the other side of the Adriatic, from the Aegean islands to the Black Sea, 
and from Greece to Asia Minor, Egypt, and even Tunisi.  
Despite the time-period and the variety in the geographical origin of the Venetian 
material, the evidence indicates that over 95 percent of the known contracts were entered by 
Venetians, the great majority of whom resided in the Rialto, the city we know today as Venice 
(table 3). In terms of traders, 97.8 percent of the 321 investors (out of 334) who are identified 
as Venetians financed City merchants only and 95.9 percent of the 223 merchants (out of 233) 
who are said to be Venetians relied exclusively on Venetian capital (table 1).
88 Furthermore, 
                                                      
86 Greif, “Reputation,” p. 880. See also Greif, “Contractual Enforceability”, “Cultural Beliefs”, and Institutions. 
87 Inter-community relations, though, could take place outside the rule of the state. Provided that an investor 
could assure a merchant that their bilateral relation would last for a long time and would be very profitable, he 
could be certain that the merchant would not cheat him, regardless of the investor’s and merchant’s political 
affiliations. 
88 As expected, Venetian notaries did not record contracts in which both parties were non-Venetian.    25
eight out of the ten known foreign merchants were attached to Venice by residing in the City 
or in the Venetian colony of Constantinople. 
TABLE 3. 
Venetian Contracts classified by traders’ place of origin and residence 
 
  Investors Merchants 
Venetians residing in Rialto  380  87.36 %  407  93.56 % 
Venetians residing in the lagoon  28  6.44 %  16  3.68 % 
Venetians residing in the Greek Empire, Istria or Dalmatia  18  4.14 %  3  0.69 % 
Non-Venetians residing in Rialto  3  0.69 %  5  1.15 % 
Non-Venetians residing outside the lagoon  6  1.38 %  4  0.92 % 
Total  435  100 %  435  100 % 
 




The segregated character of Venetian trade is the more striking if compared with the 
Genoese. Although Genoese cartularies were written in Genoa and are thus more likely to 
reflect agency relations among the Genoese, they nevertheless clearly show the establishment 
of financial relations between Genoese and non-Genoese. According to the cartulary of John 
the Scribe, at least 18.4 percent of the total value of goods shipped abroad was sent or carried 
by a non-Genoese trader. More generally, it has been calculated that 12 to 15 percent of the 
1345 traders that are mentioned in the Genoese cartularies for the period 1155-1200 were 
truly non-Genoese (see table 1).
89 
Another kind of evidence that would refute the conjecture that the state provided 
contract enforcement is the observation of investments through individuals who already had a 
personal and bilateral relation with the merchant to be funded. The Genoese source, but not 
the Venetian, indicates that an investor in search of funding a merchant once formed a 
partnership with another investor who regularly backed that particular merchant and together 
they supplied him funds. Furthermore, contrary to some Genoese prominent families who 
seem to have been amalgamating the entire family’s fortune, Venetian families usually 
invested   separately,   each  member  investing  his own capital.  Besides,  Venetian  patrician  
                                                      
89 Consistent with a bilateral reputation mechanism, the Genoese “integrated” themselves with natives in other 
political centers in possession of better knowledge of local conditions (Greif, “Cultural Beliefs,” pp. 930-935).   26
families did not live together as clans in large compounds, as did the Genoese.
90 The evidence 
thus suggests that while the Genoese combined their resources to form a unit of decision with 
a longer life span and a lower probability of bankruptcy, thereby increasing the unit’s ability 
to commit to a bilateral long-term relation, the Venetians operated individually through 
anonymous markets. 
Yet, the Genoese introduced legal constraints to reinforce the operation of their 
bilateral reputation mechanism. For example, Genoese courts held a merchant and all his 
family responsible for observable transgressions, such as outright embezzling the investor’s 
capital. The Genoese reliance on the legal system to enforce contracts characterized by 
symmetric information is also clear from the specification in loan contracts and sea loan 
contracts that a delay in repayment was subject to a double penalty. Furthermore, to help the 
investor evaluate the true venture’s profit, the typical Genoese commenda contract stipulated 
that, after the completion of the voyage, the merchant was to place the entire proceeds of the 
commenda in the hands of the investor, under whose direction, though with the merchant 
assistance, the division of profits was carried out.
91  
In sharp contrast, Venetian law clearly established that only the son under parental 
authority or jointly with his father was liable for his father’s debts.
92 Also, commenda 
contracts in Venice typically laid down a double penalty for late payment and increasingly 
allowed the merchant to “dispatch the proceeds that accrued to the [investor] in the care of a 
third-party…, without returning in person to render accounts” and “to retain possession of 
his own part.” In addition, the typical thirteenth-century Venetian commenda contract left the 
merchant free to “do business by land or sea, carrying, entrusting, abandoning, and 
recovering all or part of the merchandise wherever it seems good to  [him],” so long as he 
joined the convoys organized by the state from Venice to her colonies in the East.   
Why did family’s legal responsibility and contracts’ dispositions vary so widely? Why 
did the Venetians feel the need neither to hold family members liable for the merchant’s 
verifiable illegal actions nor to limit the merchant’s freedom of action? A consistent 
explanation can be advanced based on the assumption that the state provided contract 
enforcement in Venice. Economic rents enabled Venetian merchants to commit not to 
                                                      
90 For Genoa, see Greif, Institutions. For Venice, see Buenger, “Domenico Gradenigo,” p. 28, and Chojnacki, 
“Search,” p. 60. In Venice, even women invested on their own account, not for their husbands (MRL, 
Documenti, # 475, 495, 506, 588, 602, and 604). During the thirteenth century, the Genoese adopted the family 
firm, the essence of which was a permanent partnership with unlimited and joint liability that preserved the 
family’s wealth under one roof. Although a kind of family firm, the fraterna, was known in Venice from at least 
the tenth century, it soon became obsolete and always remained a purely family concern. 
91 Byrne, “Commercial Contracts,” pp. 136-37; Greif, Institutions; and Pryor, “Mediterranean Commerce,” pp. 
175-76. 
92 St. of Enrico Dandolo, 68, edited by Besta and Predelli.    27
embezzle the whole or part of the investor’s capital without making their relatives legally 
responsible for their business dealings, while tight administrative controls over trade provided 
the verifiable information require to evaluate merchant’s conduct. This suggests that Venetian 
sea loans and commenda contracts were indeed governed by the state.  
4.  Conclusions 
A theoretical and empirical analysis of the Venetian institutions for contract 
enforcement reveals that, above and beyond the role of the family, ethics, and bilateral 
reputation in constraining the merchants’ opportunistic behavior, the state functioned as an 
enforcement and information-transmission mechanism. However, the nature, role and 
foundation of the state differed substantially from that posited by economic historians and 
economists to the legal system. 
The Venetian state cannot be identified with a third party that uses coercion to enforce 
contracts.  The state induced merchants to fulfill their contractual obligations with other 
Venetians by supporting the belief that living up to their contracts would lead to the 
enjoyment of present and future rents, while a contract’s violation would be followed by 
exclusion from these rents and, possibly, legal sanctions. This reputation mechanism, 
however, differed from that prevailing among the Maghribi coalition in that the Venetians did 
neither engage in informal monitoring of the merchants’ conduct nor practice collective 
punishment. On the contrary, the Venetians relied largely on the state to generate verifiable 
information and to punish cheaters.  
The role of the state, though, went beyond regulating the ex-ante behavior of 
merchants in a manner that facilitated the ex-post verification of a breach of contract and 
forcing solvent borrowers within its jurisdiction to repay if they failed to do so spontaneously. 
To guarantee property rights and the enforceability of contracts, the Venetian state 
coordinated a collective military and diplomatic action, became the major shipbuilder, leased 
state-owned galleys to private enterprise, arranged the organization, protection and timing of 
trading convoys, and restricted foreign and domestic entry. In other words, to enable the 
smooth operation of financial markets among the Venetians, the state converted private trade 
into a public affair and introduced barriers to labor and capital mobility. This historical 
episode thus suggests that state ample intervention might have a positive role on growth and 
questions our inherited wisdom about the virtue of liberalizing all markets at once.  
The state was a self-enforcing institution for contract enforcement, exogenous to each 
individual but endogenous to the society. The state operated both as an economic institution,   28
which enabled the Venetian citizens to exchange through financial markets and hence resulted 
in a wide distribution of trading profits, and as a political institution, which restrained the 
tyrannical exercise of power and ensured a pluralistic dispersion of power. This motivated the 
Venetians to support the existing economic and political institutions and to resist anyone’s 
attempt to challenge the state, which in turn deterred anyone from trying. 
The constancy of the rule of law and domestic peace in Venice might have not been 
perfect but the contrast with other strife-ridden city-state remains stark. For example, Genoa 
was characterized by violent internal political conflicts which hindered economic growth and, 
at times, submitted her political independence to foreign lords. The intriguing questions then 
are why these otherwise similar Italian city-states evolved along such different institutional 
trajectories? What dynamics characterized the process of equilibrium selection? Did 
distinctive historical experiences ultimately bring about distinct institutional equilibria in 
Venice and Genoa, and if so, what prevented the Genoese from adopting similar institutions. 
These questions lead the way to a future comparative and historical institutional analysis that 
may facilitate our understanding of both past economic developments and the political 
impediments to economic growth in contemporary developing countries.    29
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